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Stanley in Cyberspace: Why the Privacy
Protection of the First Amendment Should
Be More Like That of the Fourth
Marc Jonathan Blitz*
The 1969 case Stanley v. Georgia forbade the government from restricting the books that
an individual may read or the films he may watch “in the privacy of his own home.”
Since that time, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that Stanley’s protection
applies solely within the physical boundaries of the home: While obscene books or films
are protected inside of the home, they are not protected en route to it—whether in a
package sent by mail, in a suitcase one is carrying to one’s house, or in a stream of data
obtained through the Internet.
However adequate this narrow reading of Stanley may have been in the four decades
since the case was decided, it is ill-suited to the twenty-first century, where the in-home
cultural life protected by the Court in Stanley inevitably spills over into, or connects with,
electronic realms beyond it. Individuals increasingly watch films not, as the defendant in
Stanley did, by bringing an eight millimeter film or other physical copy of the film into
their house, but by streaming it through the Internet. Especially as eReaders, such as the
Kindle, and tablets, such as the iPad, proliferate, individuals read books by downloading
digital copies of them. They store their own artistic and written work not in a desk drawer
or in a safe, but in the “cloud” of data storage offered to them on far-away servers.
Thus, I argue that courts should revisit and revise their understanding of Stanley v.
Georgia in the same way that Katz v. United States revised Fourth Amendment law in
1967—by holding that the privacy it protected is not limited to the physical boundaries of
the home (as United States v. Olmstead had held in 1928) but covers wire-line
communications and other electronic environments in which individuals have an
expectation of privacy. This is not to say that the Court’s understanding of Stanley v.
Georgia should be revised in precisely the same way. However, Stanley v. Georgia
should, at a minimum, be extended to protect web-based interactions, where use of an
electronic resource outside of the home, such as the Internet, is an integral component of
the act of possessing, viewing, or reading cultural material.

* Associate Professor, Oklahoma City University School of Law; J.D., University of Chicago, 2001;
Ph.D., University of Chicago, 2001; B.A., Harvard University, 1989. Thanks to the following people for
illuminating conversations that helped me think about and refine the arguments of this Article: John Eden,
Michael Grynberg, Jennifer Lynch, Michael O’Shea, Neil Richards, Chris Soghoian, and Debbie Tussey. I am
also grateful to Sara Tosdal, Andrew Meade, Jacqueline Young, Brian Pettit, Melissa Kincaid, Molly Wilkens
and the editors of the Hastings Law Journal for their help in preparing this Article for publication.
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This originates from within our environment. It has to,
because nothing can come in from outside except words.
1
—Philip K. Dick, Ubik
It isn’t just worn out; it’s forty years obsolete. . . . [T]he
damn thing is antiquated. Junk it. Forget about it.
2
—Philip K. Dick, Ubik

Introduction
2009 was a year that saw an unusually large number of historic
fortieth anniversary celebrations, among them, those marking the
landing of Apollo on the moon, the creation of the Internet, the
Woodstock music festival, the first episode of Sesame Street, and the
3
New York Mets’s improbable World Series victory. All of these events
happened in 1969, some with more fanfare and news coverage than
others. To this list of anniversaries, lawyers and legal scholars were able
to add their own, as they reflected upon the lasting significance of the

1. Philip K. Dick, Ubik (1969), reprinted in Four Novels of the 1960s, at 609, 781 (Jonathan
Lethem ed., 2007).
2. Id. at 710.
3. See Julie Bloom et al., 1969, N.Y. Times (July 17, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/packages/
html/arts/20090717-1969-feature/ (listing and providing a slide show of photographs depicting
highlights from 1969); see also Hank Stuever, Enough Already! All ’69 Anniversaries Should be 86ed,
Wash. Post, Sept. 6, 2009, at E2; JohnnyB, The 40th Anniversary of 1969, Late for the Sky (Aug. 9,
2009 3:28 PM), http://johnnyb-lateforthesky.blogspot.com/2009/08/40th-anniversary-of-1969.html.
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Supreme Court’s landmark school speech decision in Tinker v. Des
4
Moines Independent Community School District.
But there was another important First Amendment case decided in
1969, the fortieth anniversary of which passed far more quietly: the
5
Supreme Court’s decision in Stanley v. Georgia. The silence was, in a
sense, appropriate, for instead of bringing the case into line with evolving
technologies, the Supreme Court’s subsequent glosses on Stanley have
kept it as narrow in scope as it was when it was first decided, and
arguably, have made it even narrower. Stanley held that even though
obscene movies or books can generally be constitutionally prohibited or
punished when in public—because courts view such expression as falling
outside the bounds of the First Amendment—such materials are
nonetheless protected by the First Amendment when read or viewed by a
6
person in her own home. To hold otherwise and to allow the State to
regulate which books we read or films we watch within the home, the
Court declared, would come too close to permitting the “control [of]
men’s minds” and clearly at odds with our First Amendment
7
commitment to freedom of thought.
But while these words have been cited by numerous courts in the
subsequent decades, their significance has been tightly limited by a series
of decisions holding that material protected once inside the home is not
constitutionally shielded en route to it. The Court began imposing such
limitations in a pair of decisions issued only two years after Stanley. In
United States v. Reidel, it rejected the petitioner’s argument that the State
of California violated his First Amendment rights when it indicted him
under obscenity laws for mailing three copies of a booklet called “The
8
True Facts About Imported Pornography.” “Whatever the scope of the
‘right to receive’ referred to in Stanley,” the Court said, “it is not so
broad as to” establish a “right to do business in obscenity and use the
9
mails in the process.” In United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs,
it went further and held constitutional the seizure of photographs that
the owner had not shared or sent to anyone else—but was rather carrying
10
in his own suitcase on a return trip from Europe. A “port of entry,” said
11
the Court, “is not a traveler’s home.” Indeed, obscenity could be seized
“when discovered in the luggage of a returning foreign traveler even

4. See generally Symposium, Tinker Turns 40: Freedom of Expression at School and Its Meaning
for American Democracy, 58 Am. U. L. Rev. 1119 (2009).
5. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
6. Id. at 565.
7. Id.
8. 402 U.S. 351, 353 (1971).
9. Id. at 355–56.
10. 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971).
11. Id. at 365.
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though intended solely for his private use.” Two years later, in 1973, the
Court continued the narrowing of Stanley in a trio of decisions issued on
the same day. In United States v. Orito, it found constitutional the
government’s seizure of obscene films from a storage area of a private
13
airline. In United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, it
likewise approved the seizure of films from a package carried by
14
someone entering the United States from Mexico. In Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, the case where the Court made clear that the State
may punish the screening of pornographic films, even to willing adult
viewers, the Court emphasized again that Stanley had force only within
15
the home. In all three of these decisions, Chief Justice Burger asserted
that the freedom of thought protected in Stanley v. Georgia was without
force not only in public channels of commerce, but everywhere in public
life: There is no “zone of constitutionally protected privacy [that] follows
[obscene] material when it is moved outside the home area protected by
16
Stanley.”
In recent years, lower courts have uniformly held that pornography
may be seized or punished not only in the mail or in physical
transportation, but also in electronic channels of communication. For
example, in United States v. Whorley, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit stated that obscene materials obtained through e-mail or
through an “interactive computer service” are not within the scope of
17
Stanley v. Georgia’s protection. Other courts have reached the same
18
conclusion. More specifically, they have upheld the application of 18
U.S.C. § 1462 to e-mails received at home or webpages viewed at home.
Section 1462 provides,
Whoever . . . knowingly uses any . . . interactive computer service . . . for
carriage in interstate or foreign commerce . . . [of] any obscene, lewd,
lascivious, or filthy . . . writing . . . or other matter of indecent
19
character[,] . . . [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned . . . .

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit likewise rejected, in United
States v. Extreme Associate, Inc., the notion that, in understanding the

12. Id. at 376 (emphasis added).
13. 413 U.S. 139, 140 (1973).
14. 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973).
15. 413 U.S. 49, 57, 66–67 (1973).
16. Orito, 413 U.S. at 141–42.
17. 550 F.3d 326, 332–33 (4th Cir. 2008).
18. See United States v. Stagliano, 693 F. Supp. 2d 25, 28–29 (D.D.C. 2010) (allowing prosecution
of individuals charged with displaying an obscene movie trailer over an “interactive computer
service”); United States v. McCoy, 678 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1365–73, (M.D. Ga. 2009); see also United
States v. Little, No. 8:07-CR-170-T-24MSS, 2008 WL 151875, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 2008) (finding
Stanley allows government to seize and criminalize pornography transmitted “over the Internet”).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (2006).
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scope of Stanley v. Georgia, “a new analytical path is necessary in
20
Internet cases.”
Some scholars have argued that in light of such precedent, Stanley is
better understood as a privacy case than as a First Amendment case:
Instead of marking out a sphere of activity as within the realm of
protected speech or receipt of information, it marks out a particular place
(namely, the home) that is a realm of individual sovereignty, instead of
21
state control. The Supreme Court itself has indicated as much,
22
emphasizing that Stanley’s holding was “narrow” and stating that it was
23
“hardly more than a reaffirmation that ‘a man’s home is his castle.’”
But these observations hardly foreclose all questions about Stanley’s
meaning, especially as emerging technologies expand and transform the
“castle” walls in which individuals enclose themselves. Modern
computing power and networking technology not only allow individuals
to rapidly deliver reading or viewing materials to their homes through
the Web or digital downloading, but also to create virtual extensions of
their homes. More specifically, many of the cultural activities we engage
in inside the home—reading, watching a video, surfing the Web—can
now be performed in the privacy of a digital home instead of a physical
one. Instead of relaxing in our living rooms, we might do so in the much
more “spacious” living room of a virtual mansion we acquire in Second
24
25
Life or another virtual world. Instead of buying a safe or chest to store
paper documents in a closet, we might buy virtual space in the “cloud” of
26
computer-based storage that numerous companies, such as Google,
27
28
Apple, or Dropbox, provide for people to store digital files outside of
29
their homes. Instead of buying and reading a physical book, many
individuals armed with an eReader, an iPad, or another tablet computer

20. 431 F.3d 150, 161 (3d Cir. 2005). The court added that Internet transmission of pornography is
not beyond the scope of Stanley’s First Amendment protection but is unprotected by any parallel right
to freedom of thought or autonomy that might arise out of the substantive due process rights of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 159.
21. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of Pornography as
Act and Idea, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 1564, 1576 (1988) (“[B]ecause the Court refused to own up to the
implications of its holding in Stanley, the case can only be understood as a privacy decision . . . .”).
22. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108 (1990).
23. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973).
24. Second Life, http://secondlife.com/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2010).
25. See F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 1,
5, 30 (2004) (describing how individuals gather in “virtual living room[s]” in Blazing Falls and other
virtual worlds, and how one can “buy a completed mansion” there).
26. See Google Docs, http://www.google.com/google-d-s/documents/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2010).
27. See Apple MobileMe, http://www.apple.com/mobileme/features/idisk.html (last visited Dec.
17, 2010).
28. See Dropbox, https://www.dropbox.com/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2010).
29. See Geoffrey A. Fowler & Ben Worthen, The Internet Industry Is on a Cloud—Whatever that
May Mean, Wall St. J., Mar. 26, 2009, at A1 (“[In cloud computing, i]nformation is stored and
processed on computers somewhere else—‘in the clouds’—and brought back to your screen.”).
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might read a digital book that—unlike its physical counterpart—remains
electronically tethered to and, in some cases, subject to alteration or
30
deletion by the company that provided it.
Are these private cyberspaces covered in any part by the Stanley
decision’s insistence on safeguarding a person’s “right to be free from
31
state inquiry into the contents of his library”? Or does the storing of
that library in the cloud or the act of linking it to the Internet through a
computer or a digital reader open it up to state control? May the
government thus mandate the deletion of an already-downloaded digital
book, even though Stanley prevents seizure of the same book in its
physical form? Is it the case, in other words, that the only home that
serves as a person’s “castle” for First Amendment purposes is the brickand-mortar home she sleeps and eats in, rather than the numerous virtual
and electronic extensions of her home in which she can now find
additional privacy?
The answer to this question might seem clear, based on the
consistent denial by the lower courts of Stanley’s protection to
32
“interactive computer services.” In a sense, Stanley is frozen in time as a
result of these interpretations: It protects only physical spaces, not virtual
homes, digitally-created spaces on the Internet, or the private sensory
enclaves we create and use outside the home with laptops, portable DVD
players, and other electronic devices. Thus, the only home protected for
First Amendment purposes is the physical space. But, I suggest here that
this answer is deeply problematic, and perhaps simply wrong. For it
applies assumptions to First Amendment protection of private
information that have long been discredited in another, similar area of
constitutional protection for liberty and privacy: the Fourth
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches. Many years
before the federal courts held that information channeled to a home
through an Internet connection lies outside the purely in-home realm
protected by Stanley, the Court’s 1928 decision in Olmstead v. United
States came to virtually the same conclusion about phone wires: “[O]ne
who installs in his house a telephone instrument with connecting wires
intends to project his voice to those quite outside, and . . . the wires

30. See Brad Stone & Motoko Rich, Companies Race to Rule the E-Books, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21,
2010, at B1 (describing the market for eBooks as “nascent but booming”); Andrew Berg, Amazon:
eBook Sales Surpass Hardcovers, WirelessWeek (July 20, 2010), http://www.wirelessweek.com/News/
2010/07/Business-Amazon-eBook-Sales-Hardcovers-Mobile-Content/ (“[A] lower price point for
eReaders is stimulating dramatic growth in eBook sales.”); see also Nicole A. Ozer & Jennifer A.
Lynch, Protecting Reader Privacy in Digital Books, Ass’n for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence Symposium, Mar. 2010, at 136, 138, available at http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/SSS/
SSS10/paper/view/1041/1500 (explaining that providers of eBooks can monitor the books they have
provided and even “delete whole books”).
31. 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
32. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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beyond his house and messages while passing over them are not within
33
the protection of the Fourth Amendment.”
But Olmstead no longer provides the rule for what is and is not
covered by Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
searches. In 1967, the Supreme Court overruled Olmstead in Katz v.
34
United States. It held that individuals have a constitutional right to
protection against unfettered government monitoring not only inside of
their homes, but also in various electronic environments, on phone lines,
35
and in public phone booths. “[T]he Fourth Amendment” it said,
“protects people, not places . . . . [W]hat [a person] seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
36
protected.” Under the modern formulation of Katz (based chiefly upon
the concurrence by Justice Harlan in that case), individuals are protected
from government monitoring everywhere they have an “expectation of
37
privacy . . . that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”
This expectation depends heavily upon the nature of the place
where they are located, but it is not only the home itself where privacy
from government can be expected: As the Court said in a later case,
“people are not shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection when they
38
step from their homes onto the public sidewalks.” Why then are they
shorn of their First Amendment right to private possession or viewing of
reading materials when they step from their homes onto these sidewalks?
Why does the Court insist there is no “zone of constitutionally protected
privacy [that] follows” a reader or film viewer “when [she goes] outside
39
the home area protected by Stanley”? Freedom of thought and
intellectual exploration is, after all, no less fundamental to our
constitutional order than freedom from unreasonable searches. Such
freedom has been described by the Court as “the matrix, the
40
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.” Why,
then, should the now forty-one-year-old case of Stanley v. Georgia
adhere to constitutional assumptions similar to those rejected in
Olmstead v. United States, decided forty-one years before Stanley?
I argue here that it should not—that it is no longer tenable to isolate
Stanley’s freedom-of-thought protection from technological development
and public space. This is not to say that the shield Stanley provided to
pornography and to other low-value speech can nullify all state

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
389 U.S. 347, 352–53 (1967).
Id.
Id. at 351–52.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 141–42 (1973).
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
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restriction of such speech in public life. As Chief Justice White correctly
pointed out in United States v. Reidel, the Court made it clear in Stanley
that obscenity was still, in most circumstances, outside the protection of
41
the First Amendment. There may be good reason to think the Court is
42
mistaken to deny First Amendment protection to obscene speech, but if
that is true, then this is a mistake the Court largely endorsed, rather than
repudiated, in Stanley. What the Stanley decision did not endorse is a
First Amendment regime that would leave individuals subject to state
control of the book, film, and photo libraries in their own homes.
Freezing Stanley’s holding in time so that it remains applicable only to
the technology of the late 1960s leaves individuals vulnerable to such
cultural micromanagement from the outside; it threatens to let Stanley’s
freedom-of-thought protection become an anachronism, as our living
rooms become more and more electronically (and inextricably)
intertwined with sites outside of the home, such as the Internet servers
from which we download videos and websites.
Consequently, I suggest here that courts bring Stanley’s freedom-ofthought protection up-to-date technologically and put it in line with
similar privacy protections in Fourth Amendment law by adopting two
principles for applying the case in the future. First, they should recognize
that it is not always possible to distinguish between the act of privately
possessing and viewing a film—which Stanley held to be protected—and
the act of delivering that film through channels of commerce—which
Reidel held not to be protected. There are circumstances where these two
activities merge into one another, where one can access and view text or
video in one’s home only while simultaneously transmitting it through
wire lines from the outside world. This is particularly true in cloud
computing. A web user can see text or video only as it is delivered
through the Internet from outside. In such circumstances, Stanley should
protect the transmission of a film as well as its possession, because it can
protect the latter only if it also protects the former.
Second, as Judge Roger Gregory recently noted in a dissent in
United States v. Whorley, even the cases narrowing Stanley did not,
before the decision in Whorley, expressly allow the State to bar or punish
“the sending or receiving of obscene materials [that] involve[] neither a

41. See United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 354 (1971) (“[T]he States retain broad power to
regulate obscenity; that power simply does not extend to mere possession by the individual in the
privacy of his own home.” (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (internal quotation
marks omitted))).
42. See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, Obscenity: An Outdated Concept for the Twenty-First Century,
10 Nexus J. Op. 21, 22 (2005) (“Miller has long been antithetical to sound First Amendment theory
[and] should be overruled.”).
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commercial transaction nor any kind of victim.” Courts should adopt
Judge Gregory’s Fourth Circuit dissent as the majority rule.
Part I of this Article looks closely at some of the electronic
extensions of the home I mentioned earlier—the “cloud” of computer
space we use on far-away servers, virtual environments like Second Life,
and digital books, like those available on Kindle or iPad. It notes that
existing precedent in Fourth Amendment law is likely to provide a basis
for barring warrantless State searches of many of these new private
electronic environments, but that the same cannot be said of the First
Amendment rights recognized in Stanley. Part II then argues that this
technological freezing of Stanley’s scope should be abandoned—because
it is neither the case that (1) Stanley’s freedom-of-thought protection is
inappropriate in cyberspace or in the other private electronic spaces
available outside the home, nor that (2) there is something unique about
the home that makes it the only environment appropriate for Stanley’s
protection.

I. The Changing Nature of the Right to Read: Privacy Rights in
the Cloud, in eReading, and in Virtual Worlds
In the early twenty-first century, the cultural life of the home and of
private individual reflection is largely pieced together as we draw upon,
and react to, a continuous stream of information delivered from the
44
outside world. As our in-home reading and video watching migrates to
electronic spaces, such as the cloud and other virtual environments, does
Stanley’s protection for freedom of thought and receipt of information
move with them? Or does our movement into a future, always-connected
home life necessarily entail leaving Stanley’s freedom of thought behind?
I will begin to approach such questions by saying more about the
three specific examples I have discussed above: cloud computing, virtual
environments, and eReaders. I then explain why these environments,
although likely denied protection under the current understanding of
Stanley, may well receive some Fourth Amendment protection against
warrantless searches.
A. Cloud Computing
Increasingly, written documents we once composed on a desk and
stored in a drawer, a wooden chest, or a safe are now composed and
43. 569 F.3d 211, 212 (4th Cir. 2009) (Gregory, J., dissenting), denying reh’g en banc to 550 F.3d
326 (4th Cir. 2008).
44. See Adam Ostrow, CES Shows Us the Internet of the Future, CNN.com (Jan. 11, 2010),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/01/11/mashable.ces.wrapup/index.html ([If the CES convention] is
any indication, the 2010s are going to bring about another quantum leap in the way we work, play and
communicate as the Internet becomes embedded in virtually everything we do. . . . [T]he Internet [is]
becoming as ubiquitous as electricity . . . .”).
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stored electronically, in “the cloud.” “Cloud computing,” as one writer
explains the concept, is “a data-hosting method in which information or
46
services can be accessed by users through the [I]nternet.”
“Information,” as a Wall Street Journal primer on the subject explains,
“is stored and processed on computers somewhere else—‘in the
47
clouds’—and brought back to your screen.” Like digital information
that is loaded onto, and remains on, one’s own computer, the digital
information that we summon from the cloud can take any number of
forms: It can be a document that the user herself has written or is in the
48
process of writing; it can be a book or a magazine article written by
49
someone else; it can be a photograph, a drawing, or an album full of
50
51
photographs and drawings; it can be a movie or another video.
Moreover, the text or image accessed from distant computer services
often gives little clear indication of its origins. The text that one opens
and edits in Google Docs, for example, looks almost identical to the way
52
it would look if it were stored on one’s own computer. Indeed, the cloud
can mimic one’s own, in-home computer in another way: Apart from
45. See Fowler & Worthen, supra note 29; see also Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud:
Privacy, Encryption, and Government Back Doors in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. on Telecomm. & High
Tech. L. 359, 361 (2010) (“Over 69% of Americans now use webmail services, store data online, or
otherwise use software applications such as word processing programs whose functionality is in the
cloud.” (citing John B. Horrigan, Cloud Computing Gains in Currency, Pew Research Ctr. (Sept. 12,
2008), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/948/cloud-computing-gains-in-currency)); William Jeremy Robison,
Note, Free at What Cost? Cloud Computing Privacy Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 Geo.
L.J. 1195, 1203 (2010) (“Widespread consumer embrace of early cloud computing offerings suggests
that a meaningful shift is underway, rather than a passing fad.”).
46. Brian X. Chen, Apple’s New Data Center Likely to Focus on Cloud Computing, Wired
Gadget Lab (Aug. 17, 2009, 4:33 PM), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2009/08/apple-cloud/.
47. See Fowler & Worthen, supra note 29.
48. See John Arlidge, Are Our Heads in the Cloud?, Sunday Times (London), Aug. 9. 2009, at 42
(describing a firm that uses the cloud to store and edit “thousands of files” including “spreadsheets, emails, contacts” and a table that tracks the progress of current projects); see also Google Docs, supra
note 26 (“Create and share documents on the web and access them from any computer or smart
phone.”).
49. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, Zinio Magazine, http://imgs.zinio.com/faq/cs.htm
(select query “What are the most basic things I need to know to get started?”) (last visited Dec. 17,
2010) (“Zinio gives you two great ways to view your magazines on a computer: online using a web
browser or offline using the Zinio Reader software. The Online Reader gives you the ability to access
your magazines from any web browser with Adobe Flash installed.”).
50. See SheldonW, Media Distribution, Mobile Entertainment and the Cloud, The Digital
Lifestyle (Oct. 17, 2009, 2:10 PM), http://thedigitallifestyle.com/cs/TDL/b/cloud/archive/2009/10/17/
mobile_2D00_computing_2D00_the_2D00_cloud.aspx (“I . . . use public cloud services such as Google
Apps, Microsoft Workspace Live, Spotify, YouTube, Flickr and Picasa to store, access and share
documents, videos, photo’s [sic] and music . . . .”); see also Photobucket, http://photobucket.com (last
visited Dec. 17, 2010) (“Upload, manage, and share your photos and videos for FREE!”).
51. See Company History, YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/t/company_history (last visited
Dec. 17, 2010) (“YouTube allows people to easily upload and share video clips on www.YouTube.com
and across the Internet through websites, mobile devices, blogs, and email.”).
52. Google Docs, supra note 26 (noting that the documents one sees and edits online have a
“familiar desktop feel”).
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displaying text or image files that are actually on a server miles away, it
can also allow use of computer applications, such as a Word processing
53
program, that are actually running on that far-away server.
Indeed, as R. Bruce Wells points out, these “online applications
have already become almost indistinguishable from their offline
54
counterparts.” And as Wells observes, the cloud’s ability to both
substitute for, and perfectly simulate, in-home computing presents a
significant challenge to legal rules that offer protection to only one of
55
these environments and not the other.
This is not the only challenge the rise of cloud computing raises for
the future relevance of Stanley, however. Assume that it is possible to
provide computer users with unmistakably clear warnings that a file they
are viewing, or a program they are running, is actually coming from a
distant server. Would such a warning by itself justify denying them the
protection Stanley offers to private reading or film watching? It is not
entirely clear that it would. After all, the activities a person is engaging in
by accessing the cloud—reading a text, viewing a picture, or watching a
film, all entirely within their home, and all in isolation from other
people—are the digital equivalents of those protected in Stanley. If, as
the Supreme Court stated in Kyllo v. United States, the Fourth
Amendment protects not only against the government spying on us
through “physical invasions of the home,” but also in “their functional
56
equivalent,” it is plausible that the First Amendment should likewise
protect not only against censorship through physical confiscation of
books and films from our living rooms, but also the functional equivalent
of such confiscation.
Moreover, if the digital, internet-based variants of reading books,
viewing pictures, or watching videos were to become the primary or
exclusive means of engaging in such activities, then Stanley’s First
Amendment protections would either have to be extended to cover the
Internet, or effectively suffer extinction.
B. Digital Books
Another threat to Stanley, similar to that generated by the
emergence of cloud computing, is the increasing popularity of digital
books. One of the most widely-quoted passages in Stanley is its insistence
that “[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that the State
has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books
53. See Arlidge, supra note 48 (“In the cloud, the internet becomes our operating system. We use
online software that runs in our browser to create the files we need.”).
54. R. Bruce Wells, Note, The Fog of Cloud Computing: Fourth Amendment Issues Raised by the
Blurring of Online and Offline Content, 12 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 223, 233 (2009).
55. Id. at 234.
56. 533 U.S. 27, 44 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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57

he may read . . . .” But this statement assumed that the act of reading a
book “sitting alone in [one’s] own house” was an act isolated from the
public world. The act of reading a modern eBook, by contrast, is less
58
immune to outside influence. In July 2009, under pressure from the
copyright owner who did not want unauthorized copies distributed
through Kindle, Amazon deleted George Orwell’s 1984 and other
eBooks from Kindle users who had purchased and, in some cases, started
59
to read them. Yet it is easy to conceive of a situation where Amazon or
other eBook providers restrict content not in response to private legal
action, but rather in response to a government order. Imagine, for
example, a situation akin to that in Stanley, where a person buys and
downloads an eBook or digital magazine with arguably obscene contents,
at a time before any court has found them to be obscene. If a court later
determines that the material is obscene, might the State then require a
bookseller to remotely delete reading materials that the police could not,
under the holding of Stanley, confiscate physically? The State, after all,
could certainly impose a harsh penalty for, and order the removal of,
obscene material from a website over which it has jurisdiction, even if
this prevents a person from linking to such material from the computers
in their own living rooms. It is, thus, conceivable that officials would
likewise have authority to order an eBook provider to take all measures
possible on its own servers to put a stop to the transmission of obscene
reading materials.
Moreover, while Stanley itself concerned obscenity, one can imagine
similar questions arising with respect to other forms of speech that are
classified as “low value” by courts and, as such, are given little-to-no
protection under the First Amendment. Take, for example, books
determined to be libelous. In a blog posting responding to Amazon’s
remote deletions, Eugene Volokh asked whether Amazon would be
justified if, worried about possible lawsuits, it remotely deleted an
already downloaded digital book that “contains a libel—or discloses
60
information that invades someone’s privacy.” Such a question has
important First Amendment implications: Although defamation exposes
one to civil liability, not criminal punishment, the Supreme Court has
long made it clear that state tort rules allowing people to sue for
defamation can infringe First Amendment rights if they restrict or chill

57. 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
58. See Ozer & Lynch, supra note 30, at 3 (“Digital book providers can easily track what books an
individual considers, how often a given book is read, how long a given page is viewed, and even what
notes are written in the ‘margins.’”).
59. See Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Two Classics from Kindle. (One Is ‘1984.’), N.Y. Times, July
18, 2009, at B1.
60. See Eugene Volokh, (Hypothetical) Removal of Libelous Books from Customers’ Kindles?
The Volokh Conspiracy (July 19, 2009, 7:39 PM), http://volokh.com/posts/1248046786.shtml.
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61

protected speech. While the Court’s concerns about such restriction and
62
chilling effects have, in the past, been focused on public discussion, it is
conceivable that the interaction of emerging eReader technology could
give rise to a new kind of chilling—one which causes book providers to
remotely erase or edit the contents of the private libraries that Stanley
was meant to shield.
While Stanley was, itself, about obscenity, the right it found in the
First Amendment—“the right to be free from state inquiry into [and
63
control over] the contents of [one’s] library” —might well protect an
individual from state measures aimed at cleansing that library not only of
64
obscenity, but also of other types of low-value speech.
The State would arguably violate one’s right to read the books of
one’s choice if it required a book provider to remotely delete eBooks one
has already downloaded to a device. Drawing on cases holding Stanley
inapplicable to the Internet, courts might likewise hold Stanley to be
inapplicable here, because such electronic books, unlike their physical
counterparts, are stored in a device that remains linked and accessible to
a company in the outside world that has contractually retained some
control over the nature of the book. As Julie Cohen pointed out in 1996,
when increasing amounts of reading materials were moving online, “[t]he
same technologies that enable readers to access digitally stored
works . . . also . . . enable copyright owners to generate precise and
65
detailed records of such access.” As Nicole Ozer and Jennifer Lynch

61. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (“Although this is a civil lawsuit
between private parties, the Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to
impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It matters not that
that law has been applied in a civil action and that it is common law only, though supplemented by
statute.”).
62. See id. at 269 (“The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is
secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our decisions.” (emphasis added)).
63. 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
64. This issue has hardly produced any case law, since, outside of obscenity, the Government has
not prosecuted people for the possession or viewing of speech in their own homes. In State v. Poe, the
Idaho Supreme Court rejected the idea that Stanley’s holding would apply to “the use of fighting
words” uttered within the home (although it held that the statute at issue was overbroad, because it
criminalized some speech that, unlike fighting words, was protected). 88 P.3d 704, 720–21, 723 (Idaho
2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). The fighting words analysis is different from that of
obscenity, however, because the harm that fighting words cause to third parties—the violent response
they tend to provoke—can be just as significant whether such words are used inside or outside the
home. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (defining fighting words as words
“which, by their very utterance, inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace,” and
making no reference to whether they are said in the home or in public). Moreover, the punishment, in
that case, is directed at someone who is speaking, not simply listening to or obtaining information.
Someone who is reading or watching defamatory information or commercial speech, by contrast, may
have a claim that—like the defendant in Stanley—she should be able to choose to continue doing so in
her own home, free from state restriction.
65. Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright Management” in
Cyberspace, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 981, 983 (1996).
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have observed more recently, current eBook providers take advantage of
such monitoring capacities: Amazon, for example, “retains information
about the books, magazine subscriptions, newspapers and other digital
66
content on the Kindle and the reader’s interaction with that content.”
The lower court cases denying Stanley’s protections to the Internet
suggest that new digital books and videos fall beyond the scope of
Stanley when they are transmitted by, and remain controllable through,
67
electronic pathways. If material is unprotected when it is accessed on an
interactive computer service connected to channels of interstate
68
commerce, one would guess this also to be true when such material is
accessed on an interactive mobile device. But as noted above, this would
be an odd result in a world where most of our reading is done on
eReaders. If the library that Stanley vigorously protected from state
control soon becomes a library of eBooks, instead of paperbacks and
hardcovers, the protection that Stanley offers to that library should
survive this technological shift.
C. Virtual Worlds
Existing computing technology not only allows individuals to swap
their file cabinets and bookshelves for virtual equivalents, it allows them
to build or buy an entire virtual house. Individuals who can only afford to
rent a small studio apartment in the real world might be able to purchase
a custom-built mansion for themselves in a virtual world. The website for
the virtual world, Second Life, for example, invites users to “buy virtual
69
land and build your dream house” and offers premium members “[y]our
70
own private virtual home.” Individuals cannot, of course, literally
transport their bodies into such computer-simulated homes. The virtual
environments currently available to consumers are not yet immersive
enough to give them the illusion of doing so. Rather, individuals “enter”
and explore these computer-generated houses by controlling and
watching an animated character called an “avatar” on their computer
71
screens.
While the houses that participants create for their avatars are just
computer simulations, they have many of the characteristics and serve
many of the purposes of physical homes. Like physical land, virtual
“[r]eal estate is created or acquired, subdivided, leased, taxed and

66. Ozer & Lynch, supra note 30, at 3.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 17–20.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 17–20.
69. See What Is Second Life?, Second Life, http://secondlife.com/whatis (follow “Get Settled”
hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 17, 2010).
70. See Become a Second Life Premium Member, Second Life, http://secondlife.com/landing/
premium (last visited Dec. 17, 2010).
71. See Avatar, Second Life, http://secondlife.com/whatis/avatar (last visited Dec. 17, 2010).
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72

transferred in the game.” Like physical homes, virtual homes also play
host to intimate activity. For example, acting through their avatars,
individuals can have conversations with private guests, read a digital
73
74
book on a virtual sofa, or watch a video on a wide-screen television.
75
They can and do engage in virtual sex. As Joshua Fairfield writes, the
“anonymity” people have come to expect in “novel online environments
76
has caused people to move their intimate lives online . . . .”
To what extent are these intimate virtual activities protected by
Stanley? If, as I have noted earlier, the existing reading of Stanley offers
no protection to obscene text or imagery when it is accessed or
77
transmitted through “an interactive computer service,” then expressive
activity one engages in, or acts as an audience for, in such a virtual home
is far more vulnerable to state monitoring or censorship than is the
equivalent activity in a brick-and-mortar home. Even a virtual mansion
on a private island designed to provide maximum seclusion for its
inhabitants would offer none of the constitutional shielding that Stanley
provides to an old-fashioned film watcher or book reader in a tiny rented
apartment.
D. Fourth and First Amendment Protection for Private Electronic
Enclaves in Public Space
If Stanley becomes less and less applicable to home life, as that life
becomes more and more inextricably tied to the Internet, then what is to
be done? One possibility, as I have already noted, is to reproduce in First
Amendment law a revolution that has already occurred in Fourth

72. Sarah Howard Jenkins, Application of the U.C.C. to Nonpayment Virtual Assets or Digital Art,
11 Duq. Bus. L.J. 245, 247 (2009) (quoting Sean F. Kane, Asset Creation, Seclusion and Money
Laundering in the Virtual World, Internet L. & Strategy, July 2006, at 1) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
73. See Elizabeth Corcoran, Walk on the Virtual Side, Forbes (Dec. 4, 2006),
http://www.forbes.com/2006/12/03/second-life-online-oped-cz_ec_1204valleyletter.html; Juanita Deharo,
Virtual Books—A Change in Direction for Second Edition, Juanita Deharo (July 10, 2020, 9:16 PM),
http://juanitadeharo.blogspot.com/2010/07/virtual-books-change-in-direction-for.html; Second Life
Marketplace, Second Life, https://marketplace.secondlife.com/p/Candy-CouchSofa-and-Coffee-Table/
1232818 (last visited Dec. 17, 2010) (a site offering virtual sofas, coffee tables, and other items for one’s
virtual living room in Second Life).
74. See e.g., Punk Hobo’s Nest, X Street Second Life, https://www.xstreetsl.com/
modules.php?name=Marketplace&file=item&ItemID=884742 (last visited Dec. 17, 2010) (selling
virtual sofas and television sets to Second Life residents).
75. See Michael Rymaszewski et al., Second Life: The Official Guide 11 (2d ed. 2008)
(“Second Life gives you the freedom to pursue your dreams and interests. For some residents, this
means having as much virtual sex as possible; for others, it may mean attending a religious service or
playing combat games in spaceships they helped build.”).
76. Joshua Fairfield, Escape into the Panopticon: Virtual Worlds and the Surveillance Society, 118
Yale L.J. Pocket Part 131, 134 (2009), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/ylj-online/consitutional-law/
741-escape-into-the-panopticon-virtual-worlds-and-the-surveillance-society.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 17–20.
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Amendment law. The Supreme Court’s 1967 decisions in Katz v. United
78
79
States and in Berger v. New York expanded constitutional limits on
government searches so that they shielded not only the space inside of
the home, but also electronic channels of communication through which
individuals carried on private conversations or other private activity.
Berger made it clear that the Fourth Amendment did not allow
warrantless electronic eavesdropping into the conversations people had
80
over phone lines. Katz then expressly overruled the Court’s earlier 1928
holding in United States v. Olmstead, finding that the Fourth Amendment
protected “people, not places” and, more specifically, could shield
certain areas of public space in which people had an expectation of
privacy, such as the telephone booth that had been monitored with a
81
bugging device in Katz.
Of course, in order for this Fourth Amendment revolution to
provide a good model for a possible technological updating of Stanley, it
must cover not only conversations over phone lines and in phone booths,
but also cloud computing, eReaders, and virtual worlds. There are two
reasons to think that, unlike the First Amendment protection of Stanley,
modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence might plausibly be viewed by
courts as covering the “interactive computer services,” or the mobile
device services, that make such emerging electronic spaces possible.
One is simply that, as a result of Katz and Berger, the Fourth
Amendment now covers phone communications that travel through
wires, and thus, is more likely than Stanley to protect the data that flows
to computers over those same wires. To be sure, courts have not yet
reached a firm conclusion about the Fourth Amendment status of
internet communications. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
recently stated, “The extent to which the Fourth Amendment provides
protection for the contents of electronic communications in the Internet
82
age is an open question.” As Orin Kerr notes, “the case law applying
83
the Fourth Amendment to the Internet remains sparse.” Still, the few
courts that have addressed the question have found that the Fourth
Amendment likely does apply to the contents of e-mail and text
84
messages.

78. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
79. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
80. Id. at 54–55.
81. 389 U.S. at 351–53.
82. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 904 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2619
(2010).
83. Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 Stan.
L. Rev. 1005, 1029 (2010).
84. See, e.g., Warshak v. United States, No. 1:06-CV-357, 2006 WL 5230332, at *5 (S.D. Ohio July
21, 2006) (granting an injunction on the grounds that Warshak was substantially likely to succeed in his
claim that he had a “reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal emails”), vacated on other

Blitz_62-HLJ-357.doc (Do Not Delete)

December 2010]

STANLEY IN CYBERSPACE

1/13/2011 10:38 AM

373

The Supreme Court has thus far avoided weighing in on the subject.
Its decision this past term in City of Ontario v. Quon did not require such
an answer. Since the Justices found that a police department review of its
employees’ text messages was constitutionally permissible whether or not
such a review counted as a Fourth Amendment “search,” they did not
85
have to decide whether it did. The Court did, however, hint strongly in
dicta that there is good reason to find the Fourth Amendment applicable
to e-mail and other electronic content: “Cell phone and text message
communications are so pervasive that some persons may consider them
to be essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even
86
self-identification.” That consideration, it added “might strengthen the
case for an expectation of privacy” of the kind necessary to trigger
87
Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Even if employees lacked such a
reasonable expectation of privacy in an employer-provided e-mail or text
messaging system, the Court appeared to assume that they would still
likely be able to find such privacy in their own personal cell phone and
88
Internet accounts.
A second reason the Fourth Amendment may well apply—not only
to internet communications, but also to storage spaces in the cloud—is
that the courts have extended these protections to physical spaces that
are functionally equivalent to such storage spaces. They have held that
89
the Fourth Amendment bars suspicionless searches of purses,
90
91
92
knapsacks or book bags, storage lockers and rented apartments. As
the Supreme Court declared, in explaining why a student’s purse should
not be subject to arbitrary examination by school authorities, students
“may find it necessary to carry with them a variety of legitimate,
noncontraband items, and there is no reason to conclude that they have

grounds, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 418 (C.A.A.F. 1996)
(“[T]he transmitter of an e-mail message enjoys a reasonable expectation that police officials will not
intercept the transmission without probable cause and a search warrant.”); see also Kerr, supra note
83, at 1026–29 (noting that cases addressing the status of e-mail or other internet content have
generally found that the Fourth Amendment applies, while cases addressing the status of non-content
information have generally denied Fourth Amendment protection).
85. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010) (“[W]e assume several propositions
arguendo: First, Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages sent on the pager
provided to him by the City; Second, petitioners’ review of the transcript constituted a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment . . . .”).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. (explaining that there may not be an expectation of privacy when using company
equipment, because employees who make use of mobile devices for personal matters can purchase
devices on their own for such matters).
89. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985).
90. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d 349, 353 (8th Cir. 2004).
91. See United States v. Hamilton, 538 F.3d 162, 169 (2d Cir. 2008) ([Fourth Amendment p]rivacy
interests have been found with respect to . . . storage lockers.”).
92. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16–17 (1948).
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necessarily waived all rights to privacy in such items merely by bringing
93
them onto school grounds.” This point applies with equal force to the
spaces we use to store, or make portable, our private electronic files. In a
recent comment on the Fourth Amendment’s potential application to the
cloud, David A. Couillard points out that much of the material people
place in such electronic storage space is at least as private as the material
they place in familiar physical containers that the Fourth Amendment
has insulated against arbitrary searches: They use the cloud to store
private journals, calendars, photographs, and drafts of written work they
94
are not yet ready to share. If, as the Supreme Court has recognized,
students’ backpacks are “‘homes away from home’ for schoolchildren,”
then why not also a “digital account containing many of the same types
95
of materials, stored in the cloud.”
The same argument likely justifies extending Fourth Amendment
protection to eReaders. A government official wishing to search a
person’s eBook—whether by seizing and examining it, or by examining
its contents remotely—should have to get the same warrant before doing
so that he or she would need to search a person’s book bag. Admittedly,
courts have held that even where document or image files have been
downloaded to one’s own computer, they are not covered by a
“reasonable expectation of privacy” if they are accessible to outsiders
96
through a file-sharing program. As the Ninth Circuit stated in 2007,
“privacy expectations may be reduced if the user is advised that
information transmitted through the network is not confidential and that
the systems administrators may monitor communications transmitted by
97
the user.” To the extent that those who download eBooks are aware
that these books may still be accessed, deleted, or modified by the
company that provided them, this arguably reduces their expectations of
privacy. However, to the extent one’s electronic library is accessible to
outside monitoring or control, it is the eBook provider, not the public at
large, that has such power. Moreover, the privacy of a person’s reading
choices has been found by courts to receive significant First Amendment

93. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339.
94. David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment Principles to
Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 2205, 2219–21 (2009).
95. Id. at 2220–22 (citing Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d at 353); see also Kerr, supra note 83, at
1021 (“A busybody landlord or building superintendent might enter an apartment to look
around . . . . [This] possible invasion[ does] not eliminate Fourth Amendment protection in the home,
nor should [its] online equivalent[] eliminate that protection in virtual spaces.”).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Borowy, 595 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Borowy . . . was
clearly aware that LimeWire was a file-sharing program that would allow the public at large to access
files in his shared folder unless he took steps to avoid it. . . . Borowy’s subjective intention not to share
his files did not create an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the face of such widespread
public access.” (internal citation omitted)).
97. United States v. Heckencamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007).
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protection. As the Colorado Supreme Court recently said in its decision in
Tattered Cover v. City of Thornton, “Any governmental action that
interferes with the willingness of customers to purchase books, or
98
booksellers to sell books . . . implicates First Amendment concerns.”
The argument for applying Fourth Amendment protections to
virtual world homes is perhaps less clear, since they are less analogous to
physical homes than virtual containers are to physical storage spaces.
One does not, after all, live, sleep, and eat in a virtual home. Yet if
people purchase such virtual homes with the understanding that they can
use them for intimate activity, and can do so while electronically shielded
from outside observation, it is at least plausible that they should be as
protected by the Fourth Amendment in that context as they are in a
99
rented apartment or a hotel room.
There are, however, some concerns that arise when the Fourth
Amendment is applied in this context, and Couillard discusses the two
that are most likely to do so. First, the government must get a search
warrant, and in some cases, overcome other legal hurdles only where a
100
person has “a reasonable expectation of privacy.” The Court has often
held that people cannot have such a reasonable expectation in areas they
101
leave open to public observation. And one might claim that this is true
of Web-based storage areas or digital book shelves, which, unlike their
physical counterparts, are not covered and obscured by a bag or
enclosure that makes them invisible. As Couillard points out, however,
most personal storage areas in the cloud are enclosed by other barriers,
102
such as a password protection system or encryption of their contents.
103
These protections may be breached by a skilled computer expert. Yet
this does not make them any less privacy-protecting than the latch on a
purse or the lock on a safe, which may likewise be overcome by a
104
pickpocket or lock-picking expert.
Second, even if contents stored in a private records file are
safeguarded against observation by the world, they may be left open to
observation by a specific third party—namely, the third party to whom
98. 44 P.3d 1044, 1052 (Colo. 2002).
99. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16–17 (1948) (excluding evidence gained from
warrantless search of a hotel room); see also United States v. Owens, 782 F.2d 146, 149 (10th Cir. 1986)
(“It is settled that a motel guest is entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable searches
of his or her room.”).
100. See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 635 n.8 (1991) (“[W]herever an individual may
harbor a reasonable ‘expectation of privacy,’ he is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion.” (citation omitted) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1967))).
101. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[O]bjects, activities, or
statements that [a man] exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no
intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited.”).
102. See Couillard, supra note 94, at 2225–26.
103. See id. at 2226.
104. See id. at 2225–26.
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an individual entrusts the management of this information.
For
example, while the general public does not have access to a person’s
106
private bank account information, her bank does. While the public
cannot easily find out every phone number she dials, her phone company
107
can. Under the third-party doctrine in Fourth Amendment law, the
courts allow the government to obtain such information from banks and
phone companies without first obtaining a warrant from a neutral
108
magistrate. In short, once one has chosen to share information with
third parties, it should be clear that these third parties may then share it
109
with government officials.
This doctrine, one might argue, also applies to the information we
bring to the cloud, store in an eReader, or reveal in virtual world
activities, because all of this electronic behavior can generally occur only
with the assistance of a third party willing to host some of our data on its
servers, or in the case of eReaders, to license to us, and perhaps update,
digital books from its content delivery systems. The material most
consumers store in the cloud, for example, is stored and accessed
pursuant to license agreements they enter into with companies like
110
Google or Apple. Although many people view the digital books they
purchase for their Kindle as equivalent to the physical books they might
purchase from Amazon, one significant legal difference is that most of
these books are merely “licensed.” As Amazon’s current Kindle wireless
agreement states: “Digital Content will be deemed licensed to you by
Amazon under this Agreement unless otherwise expressly provided by

105. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court consistently has held
that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third
parties.”).
106. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“[A bank] depositor takes the risk, in
revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the
Government. This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities,
even if the information is revealed on the assumption that . . . the confidence placed in the third party
will not be betrayed.” (citation omitted)).
107. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742 (stating that everyone who uses a phone knows that they “‘convey’
phone numbers to the telephone company” when they dial them, and finding there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in these dialed numbers).
108. See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text.
110. See Arlidge, supra note 48 (explaining how customers turn to services from Google or Apple
to upload, store, and access documents). Indeed, some commentators appear to have assumed that the
third-party doctrine would likely allow the government to obtain information stored in the cloud
without the need for a warrant. See, e.g., Jane Horvath, Cloud Computing Issues, in Eleventh
Annual Institute on Privacy and Data Security Law 263, 265 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 22883, 2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court[,] in
[United States v. Miller], set a precedent that may affect the protection of data in the Cloud.”);
Robison, supra note 45, at 1226 (“Computer networks necessarily involve a third-party service
provider . . . .”).
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Amazon.” Likewise, one’s virtual world activities can occur only
because they are “rendered” by the powerful servers of the company
offering such a simulated existence. Second Life, for example, is
constantly created and recreated by the company, Linden Lab. And, as
Josh Fairfield warns, virtual world operators receive and feel bound to
“comply with government requests for call details, wiretaps, stored
chatlogs, and other business records,” which may include records of the
112
activities occurring in one’s virtual house. And the third-party doctrine
may leave us powerless to raise an effective constitutional challenge.
The third-party doctrine, however, does not automatically open to
government monitoring all the information we make available to another
party. In the first place, when the Supreme Court denied that a bank’s
disclosure of individual records constituted a Fourth Amendment search,
it took pains to stress that these records were “not [the] respondent’s
113
‘private papers.’” Many of the documents a person stores in the cloud
114
do consist of such private papers. And one’s personal library is often
regarded as possessing the same privacy, even where it consists of books
written by others. Moreover, the third-party doctrine has also been
limited, in certain circumstances, where one rents or leases personal
space from another party. Consider the example of a house or apartment
that is rented, rather than owned. In most circumstances, it is not merely
the person living in the house or apartment, but also the landlord who
has a key. Yet, as Jonathan Zittrain points out, the Court found in 1961,
even before the Katz decision, that “a police search of a rented house for
a whiskey still was a violation of the Fourth Amendment privacy rights of
the tenant, even though the landlord had given permission for the search.
115
Information stored in the cloud deserves similar safeguards.” More
specifically, there is a distinction in third-party doctrine between thirdparty intermediaries who we trust to regularly access or manage
information, as we trust banks to oversee our accounts, and other thirdparty intermediaries, like a landlord, who merely provide us a space for
116
As David Couillard writes, the
us to manage our own affairs.
111. See Kindle License Agreement, Amazon.com, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.html?nodeId=200144530 (select hyperlink “Digital Content”) (last updated Feb. 9, 2009); see
also Michael Seringhaus, Note, E-Book Transactions: Amazon ‘Kindles’ the Copy Ownership Debate,
12 Yale J.L. & Tech. 147, 149 (2009) (noting that Amazon’s license terms “prevent buyers from
actually owning books” and analyzing whether courts might nonetheless construe the contract
between Amazon and the book purchasers as a sale).
112. Fairfield, supra note 76, at 132.
113. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
622 (1886)).
114. See supra text accompanying note 94.
115. Jonathan Zittrain, Op-Ed., Lost in the Cloud, N.Y. Times, July 20, 2009, at A19 (citing
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961)).
116. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (“[D]ocuments . . . including financial statements and deposit
slips . . . contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in
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companies that give us electronic space in the cloud are more like the
latter:
[T]he service provider has a copy of the keys to a user’s cloud “storage
unit,” much like a landlord or storage locker owner has keys to a
tenant’s space, a bank has the keys to a safe deposit box, and a postal
carrier has the keys to a mailbox. Yet that does not give law
enforcement the authority to use those third parties as a means to
117
enter a private space.

Courts would likely analyze each space on its own terms, so one
cannot assume that eReaders and virtual world homes will be treated in
the same way as are storage spaces in the cloud. But there are plausible
Fourth Amendment arguments for protecting each of these spaces on the
grounds that, for each, the third-party intermediary is providing the
space—and perhaps, in the case of eReaders, a stockpile from which to
obtain content for that space—but is not managing a person’s choices or
informational activities in that space.
We find another, similar basis for shielding the details of our virtual
activities in Orin Kerr’s recently proposed framework for applying
118
Fourth Amendment law to the Internet. Cyberspace, he argues, forces
courts to recreate—in virtual environments—the distinction they have
traditionally drawn in the brick-and-mortar world between enclosed
spaces, such as the home, or a purse, or an envelope, that we use to wall
off and shield our private activities, and the open spaces that we share
119
In Fourth Amendment
with and that can be seen by others.
jurisprudence, our acts in confidential “inside” environments are
generally constitutionally shielded from officials, whereas our acts in
120
“outside” areas can be freely observed. This distinction between inside
the ordinary course of business.”); Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 470 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[The
third party doctrine] does not necessarily apply . . . to an intermediary that merely has the ability to
access the information sought by the government. Otherwise phone conversations would never be
protected, merely because the telephone company can access them; . . . storage lockers would never be
protected, by virtue of the . . . storage company’s ability to access them.”), vacated on other grounds by
532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Com v. Weis, 348 N.E.2d 787, 789 (Mass. 1976) (“[T]he authority
of [an] attendant, if any, to search on behalf of his employer d[oes] not give him power to authorize a
police search.”).
117. See Couillard, supra note 94, 2237–38. One might argue that this is not the case when a
company providing storage space or access to a particular application on the cloud expressly reserves
the right to access the content of users’ communications, documents, or other files. As Robison notes,
such provisions, allowing third-party companies to access content that can then be used to provide
users with targeted advertising, are not uncommon. See Robison, supra note 45, at 1213 (“Many cloud
providers rely extensively on advertising revenue [and use c]ontextual[ized] advertising [that] requires
access to content.”).
118. Kerr, supra note 83.
119. Id. at 1007 (“[C]ourts should try to apply the Fourth Amendment in the new environment in
ways that roughly replicate the role of the Fourth Amendment in the traditional physical setting.”).
120. Id. at 1010–12 (“[T]he police are permitted to access anything exposed to the general
public. . . . On the other hand, entering enclosed spaces ordinarily constitutes a search that triggers the
Fourth Amendment.”).
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and outside, however, has little significance in cyberspace. Thus, Kerr
proposes that courts rely, in Internet cases, on a functionally equivalent
distinction between the type of information that people would generally
choose to keep in a private, inside environment when disseminated in the
physical world (content information) and the type of information that
they would probably leave open to observation (non-content
information, such as the address and routing information on the front of
122
an envelope). As Kerr notes, “the content/non-content distinction
123
captures the basic function of the inside/outside distinction.” Whether
the Fourth Amendment is protecting one’s sanctuaries in physical
space—for example, one’s house, briefcase, or purse—or the content of
one’s files and communication in cyberspace, it is, in both cases, keeping
the State from helping itself to “the contents of the person’s mind that he
124
normally keeps to himself or only shares with a trusted few.” Such
Fourth Amendment protection for “the contents of [one’s] mind” would
almost certainly cover the electronic documents we compose, the ebooks we read, and the videos we privately watch.
This is not to say that there is no room for skepticism or uncertainty
125
here. My point is not that Fourth Amendment protection is certain in
each of these spaces, but that it would be an entirely plausible extension
of existing Fourth Amendment law. By contrast, the option of extending
Stanley to the cloud or to virtual world homes seems entirely foreclosed
by multiple courts’ refusal to extend it to interactive computer services
126
that involve the Internet.
Given courts’ persistent refusal to extend Stanley’s holding to any
space that has even slight contact with public spaces or channels of
127
communications, it is quite likely that reading and video-watching in
virtual environments would be far less protected than the reading we do
in a physical home. But why? People do not have to revert to primitive,
low-tech, and entirely in-home forms of communication or cultural
exploration to avoid unfettered monitoring. Fourth Amendment
protections against warrantless wiretapping now extend to phone lines
and broadband connections. Why, then, should individuals have to
confine themselves to increasingly outmoded technologies, disconnected
from the information superhighway, to benefit fully from the protection
that the Constitution offers for freedom of thought? Why should the

121. Id. at 1012 (“[On the] Internet, the inside/outside distinction no longer works.”).
122. Id. at 1017–18.
123. Id. at 1018.
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., supra notes 110, 117 (citing authors who believe that, under the third-party doctrine,
government access to data stored in the cloud would not likely count as a Fourth Amendment search).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 17–20.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 17–20.
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same low value speech that is protected in an old book or an eightmillimeter film be unprotected when it is read in a digitally downloaded
eBook or video, stored or accessed in virtual space? The next Part
examines some possible answers to this question, and concludes that
none of them are persuasive.

II. Redrawing First Amendment Boundary Lines: Why the
Private-Public Distinction Should Not Define the Borders of
STANLEY V. GEORGIA
Perhaps the most likely starting point for explaining why there is a
difference in the scope of Katz’s Fourth Amendment protection and
Stanley’s First Amendment protection is the difference in what “privacy”
each safeguard protects. Both can be described as protecting the privacy
that individuals find in the home (and in Fourth Amendment law, in
other private environments)—but they each protect privacy in a different
sense of the word. The Fourth Amendment largely protects information
privacy: It protects the individual against observation, monitoring, and
surveillance. As Fred Cate notes, the Fourth Amendment is “the primary
constitutional limit on the government’s ability to obtain personal
128
information about individuals.” It does so by “plac[ing] obstacles in the
129
way of a too permeating police surveillance.” Its protection of the
home, for example, is first and foremost a protection against unfettered
government gathering of “information regarding the interior of the
130
131
home.” It keeps the home “safe from prying government eyes.” By
contrast, the State’s constitutional violation in Stanley was not that it
observed or watched something it was forbidden to search for without a
132
warrant. The police did, to be sure, find the obscene movie Stanley
possessed during a search of his house—but that search occurred only
after they had acquired a warrant from a neutral magistrate based upon
probable cause that Stanley was involved in illegal bookmaking
133
activities. The State did, however, impermissibly infringe Stanley’s
134
privacy in another sense of the word: by limiting his decisional privacy.
As the Court declared, it is for each individual to determine how to
“satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own

128. Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 Harv. C.R.C.L. L. Rev. 435, 451 (2008).
129. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
130. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 37.
132. See 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969).
133. Id. at 558.
134. See Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. Rev.
1149, 1208 (2005) (“[T]he general term ‘privacy’ encompasses three separate ‘clusters.’ ‘Substantive’ or
‘decisional’ privacy is the constitutional right to make certain fundamental decisions free from
government scrutiny or interference.”).
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home.” The constitutional violation in Stanley occurred not because the
State impermissibly monitored Stanley as he read or watched movies, but
because it actively thwarted and punished certain decisions Stanley made
136
about which books to read or which films to watch.
This difference suggests one hypothesis for why the reach of Stanley
might be more limited than that of Fourth Amendment privacy
protection: Our right to almost unfettered control over the shape and
content of our own living environment, one might argue, can only reach
the extreme form it took in Stanley in an environment that belongs
wholly to the individual, or group of individuals, who claims this nearly
complete sovereignty of cultural choice. When that individual moves,
even slightly, into the shared public space one finds over the phone wires,
on the Internet, or in the physical public square, her degree of control is
necessarily lessened so that her interests may be reconciled (usually with
some government coordination) with those of others who share the
environment. In short, once she leaves the castle that is her home, her
right to control her surroundings and to make her own decisions must
now leave some room for the assertion of community values that have no
place in a purely solitary environment. By contrast, the Fourth
Amendment’s information privacy protections are more portable and are
better able to coexist with social interaction and to harmonize different
interests. Indeed, they exist to shield not only the individual’s own
decisions about how to shape her personal environment, but also her
137
numerous communications with others.
There is, however, a problem with this explanation: Even if Stanley’s
right of decisional privacy to engage in certain forms of expression or
intellectual exploration is and must be more limited in scope that Fourth
Amendment rights of information privacy, this does not clearly explain
why it must be limited to one’s brick-and-mortar home. Even if Stanley’s
right to uncensored thinking, reading, and viewing must be scaled back in
environments we share with the community, that does not mean it should
also be weakened in other, more private enclaves within public space. If
Stanley is meant to protect our solitary cultural explorations, then it
should protect not only a person’s in-home reading or film-viewing, but
also the environments where she stores information, entirely for her own
138
reading and viewing, within the cloud. Or a virtual home or apartment
135. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.
136. This is why the Court emphasized in Stanley that the First Amendment “means that [the]
State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what
films he may watch.” Id. Its concern was not just about State attempts to watch our behavior, but
about State efforts to control our behavior. Id.
137. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59, 62–63 (1967); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
662–63 (1979) (holding unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment a program of stopping and
checking certain drivers without reasonable suspicion).
138. See supra Part I.A–B.
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accessible only to herself (and the Internet Service Provider that plays
139
the role of virtual landlord). Or a stream of data that travels—in the
form of electrons—through public wires, but takes the form of an
obscene text, image, or movie only once it reaches an in-home
140
computer.
What then are the possible explanations for why Stanley’s First
Amendment protection is so much more confined than Katz’s Fourth
Amendment protection, and why, unlike the latter, it provides no
protection to virtual spaces or electronic channels of communication? I
will here consider the two most plausible ones: (1) the “character of the
public environment” argument, which contends that extending Stanley’s
freedom-of-thought protection to public space is at odds with the State’s
obligation to protect public culture or to avoid supporting activities in
public space that are at odds with communal morality; and (2) the
“unique status of the home” argument, which emphasizes that Stanley’s
protection is rooted in the unique status of our physical homes and—for
reasons of logic, social convention, or both—cannot be applied to other
environments that lack the home’s long-established historical role as a
haven from external observation and control. These arguments are not
mutually exclusive, but it is helpful to analyze each separately, since they
can each stand on their own.
A. STANLEY and the Character of the Public Environment
As noted above, one key argument against extending Stanley is that
it would tie the government’s hands in certain realms of public life that
the government must be free to regulate in order to preserve public
safety or otherwise to serve the public interest. This is the most plausible
141
logic for Chief Justice Burger’s claim, in United States v. Orito and
142
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, that there is no “‘zone’ of ‘privacy’ that
follows a distributor or a consumer of obscene materials wherever he
143
goes.” But where, precisely, is the harm or legal error in recognizing
such a zone?
First, one possible reason that First Amendment privacy rights are
more strictly confined to the home than are Fourth Amendment privacy
rights lies in the textual differences between these amendments. The

139. See supra Part I.C.
140. See Kevin Werbach, Only Connect, 22 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1233, 1251 (2007) (“[M]essages
are broken up into small packets of data, which are transferred independently by each router they
encounter along the way, and then reassembled.”).
141. 413 U.S. 139, 142–43 (1973).
142. 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973) (“[W]e have declined to equate the privacy of the home relied on in
Stanley with a ‘zone’ of ‘privacy’ that follows a distributor or a consumer of obscene materials
wherever he goes.”).
143. Id.
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Fourth Amendment’s terms do not bar unreasonable monitoring only of
144
a person’s “house[],” but also of her “person[], . . . papers and effects.”
It would be difficult, given this constitutional language, to evict the
Fourth Amendment from public spaces when such spaces are the
territory into which people bring themselves, their papers, and their
effects. By contrast, the First Amendment contains no such restriction.
But neither does it limit “freedom of speech” nor any of its corollaries to
145
the home. Indeed, when an individual leaves her home and ventures
into public space, she takes with her the mental powers of perception,
thought, and imagination that Stanley was meant to protect. The logic of
Stanley seems to apply just as forcefully to private thought in public
space, as well as to private speech or cultural exploration in cyberspace.
This specific language of the Bill of Rights therefore, does not, by itself,
provide an answer to why First Amendment privacy should have a
narrower scope than that of the Fourth Amendment.
A second explanation lies in the commercial character of the
Internet and of other channels for electronic data. The Supreme Court
first began limiting Stanley even before internet communications were
widespread, by emphasizing the government’s power to regulate
commercial activity. This was a central theme in Justice White’s majority
146
opinion in United States v. Reidel. It distinguished Stanley’s viewing of
pornographic films from Reidel’s commercial trade in pornography,
noting that “[w]hatever the scope of the ‘right to receive’ referred to in
Stanley, it is not so broad as to” establish a “right to do business in
147
obscenity and use the mails in the process.” Chief Justice Burger then
148
repeated this theme in United States v. Orito, United States v. 12 200-ft.
149
150
Reels of Super 8mm. Film, and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton. But
the Chief Justice also expressly stated something that had been, at most,
merely hinted at in White’s earlier opinions. He explained that Stanley’s
freedom-of-thought protection was inapplicable not only to commercial
activity in the public sphere, but to all activity in the public sphere, even

144. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
145. U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right to the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances.”).
146. 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
147. Id. at 355, 356.
148. 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973) (“[V]iewing obscene films in a commercial theater open to the adult
public or transporting such films in common carriers in interstate commerce, has no claim to such
special consideration.” (citation omitted)).
149. 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973) (upholding the seizure of pornography in an airline storage area, in
part, by emphasizing Congress’s broad power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.” (citing
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
150. 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973) (“[T]here are legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide of
commercialized obscenity . . . .”).
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activity seen and heard only by willing viewers and listeners. As noted
earlier, he stated that the constitutional zone of privacy protection
remains fixed to the home and does not follow the individual anywhere
152
outside of it. He was not entirely clear about the justification for this
additional narrowing of Stanley, but the Supreme Court and other courts
have suggested elsewhere that it is because all activity outside the home,
and the wire lines that lead into it, are too closely connected to
153
commerce to be treated as “private.”
This further narrowing of Stanley’s scope requires some explaining.
Consider the following three variations on Stanley’s facts—the first two
of which I have already touched upon:
(1) A modern-day Stanley does not simply possess an obscene film in
his own home, he stores it in a private space he has reserved for his use
within the “cloud,” in order to watch it over the Internet.
(2) A modern-day Stanley reads an obscene book rather than viewing
an obscene film, and reads it on an eReader after having it wirelessly
delivered to his eReader by a hypothetical seller of digital books (some
of which are pornographic). The state not only penalizes the
bookseller, but orders it to remotely delete the book it illegally sold to
Stanley.
(3) A modern-day Stanley does not simply possess the obscene film in
his own home; he receives it on a DVD sent by a friend, free of charge,
and watches it on a television set or computer.

It is hard to see why Reidel’s holding, allowing the State to target
and restrict “business in obscenity,” justifies any restriction of Stanley’s
behavior in the first two examples or that of his friend in the third. In the
first example, Stanley’s behavior is virtually identical to that in the actual
1969 case—but is updated to include the use of modern technology: He is
watching a film that he has stored in his own personal space, for his own
personal use, and is watching it in an entirely private environment such
that the outside world cannot see it unless he allows them to do so. One
might argue that the modern-day variant is commercial in nature,
because Stanley is able to store the film on a third-party server and watch

151. See supra notes 10–16 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Orito, 413 U.S. at 142–43 (“The Constitution extends special safeguards to the
privacy of the home . . . . [V]iewing obscene films in a commercial theater open to the adult
public . . . has no claim to such special consideration. . . . [T]he Government has a legitimate interest in
protecting the public commercial environment by preventing such material from entering the stream of
commerce.” (emphases added) (citations omitted) (citing Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 57)); see
also United States v. Extreme Assocs., Inc., 431 F.3d 150, 161 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Orito and Paris Adult
Theatre affirm the power of the government to ‘regulate interstate commerce to the extent of
forbidding the use of such commerce as an agency to promote immorality . . . .’ The Internet is a
channel of commerce covered by the federal statutes regulating the distribution of obscenity.”
(quoting Orito, 413 U.S. at 144 n.6)).
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it over the Internet only pursuant to a contractual arrangement he enters
into with the company operating that server. But why is that any more
commercial than keeping an obscene book or DVD in a leased desk or in
another piece of rented furniture in one’s study? The same question
might be raised about the second example. When a person receives a
physical book that she did not write herself, she doubtlessly received it
from somewhere in the outside world. The fact that the book was
obtained in a commercial transaction does not make the subsequent
reading of the books a commercial act. Why then would reading an
eBook be a commercial act?
The third example differs from the first two in that it is no longer
solely Stanley himself who is a knowing participant in possessing and
watching the obscene film: Also involved is a friend who serves as the
source of the obscene material. But it would be odd to define
“commercial” as covering any presentation of any item by one person to
another. It would, for example, be at odds with the Supreme Court’s
existing definition of “commercial speech”—which generally receives
less protection than most other protected speech—to say that any time
one person gives another a book, music CD, or video, she is engaged in
commercial expression. Rather, commercial expression is usually
understood by the Court to be first and foremost “speech which does ‘no
154
more than propose a commercial transaction.’” A simple gift from one
person to another is not a commercial transaction and does not propose
such a transaction. The Court’s decision in Bolger v. Youngs Drug
155
Products Corp. emphasized that while the proposal of commercial
transaction is perhaps the most important factor in determining whether
156
speech is commercial speech, there are also two others: (1) whether the
speech refers to a “specific product,” and (2) whether the speaker “has
157
an economic motivation” for the speech. Again, it is hard to see how
either of these factors weigh in favor of characterizing an obscene text or
movie as “commercial speech” when it is not intended to get the
individual to buy a particular product or even to buy anything at all.
Admittedly, the definition of “commerce” is broader in other parts
of constitutional law, most notably the jurisprudence of the Commerce
158
Clause. Under the Court’s 1942 decision in Wickard v. Filburn, for
example, even the act of growing food on one’s own farm for one’s own
consumption can count as commerce, because of its effect on the

154. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973)).
155. 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983).
156. Id. at 66 (referring to this factor as providing the “core notion of commercial speech”).
157. Id. at 66–67.
158. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
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market. The Court drew heavily upon similar reasoning when it held
that commerce subject to federal government regulation included even
160
the wholly in-state cultivation of medical marijuana. As long as such
activity might substantially impact commerce in the aggregate, it could be
161
subject to regulation under Congress’s Commerce Clause power.
However, applying such a broad definition proves too much. Far from
explaining the distinction between the in-home film viewing in Stanley
and the pornography commerce addressed in Reidel, it would abolish the
distinction altogether—since even Stanley’s desire to view obscenity in
his own home would affect the market for obscenity.
Nor can one save the confining boundary placed around Stanley by
arguing that even ostensibly non-commercial expression conveyed
through the Internet becomes subject to regulation when the signals that
162
constitute it travel through a “channel of commerce,” such as phone
lines. The problem, again, is that the eight-millimeter film Stanley viewed
also made its way to his house, in part, through a similar channel, most
likely the roads or other physical transportation paths. The implausibility
of trying to place principled limits on Stanley by holding it inapplicable to
all channels of commerce is illustrated by an unusual case in 2008 that
found Stanley inapplicable to a person’s in-home viewing of obscene
imagery on the grounds that the imagery “was produced using materials
163
that traveled in interstate commerce.” The question begged by this
holding is how to distinguish Stanley itself, since the film in Stanley’s
possession was also unquestionably “produced using materials that
traveled in interstate commerce,” namely, the cameras used to create
those films and the celluloid on which the films were printed.
Thus, one cannot justify banishing Stanley’s freedom-of-thought
principle from the public sphere simply by defining the whole of that
sphere as a realm of commercial activity. There is a substantial amount of
private and personal activity, much of it non-commercial, that occurs
164
outside the home. What then are the other plausible arguments for
treating the public sphere as wholly beyond Stanley’s reach?
159. 317 U.S. 111, 118, 127 (1942).
160. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18 (2005) (“The similarities between this case and Wickard are
striking. Like the farmer in Wickard, respondents are cultivating, for home consumption, a fungible
commodity for which there is an established, albeit illegal, interstate market.”).
161. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127–28 (“That appellee’s own contribution to the demand for wheat may
be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his
contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.”).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Whorley, 550 F.3d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating that the First
Amendment protection described in Stanley v. Georgia does not place limits on laws concerning “the
movement of obscene material in channels of commerce”).
163. United States v. Mees, No. 4:09CR00145 ERW, 2009 WL 1657420, at *4 (E.D. Mo. June 10,
2009).
164. It would be odd, for example, to say that individuals are engaged in the “business in
obscenity,” or the commercial distribution or display of obscenity, when they describe an allegedly
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One, perhaps, might be found in Chief Justice Burger’s statement in
Paris Adult Theatre I that the government must be empowered to restrict
obscenity in the public sphere, not merely to protect “the tone of
commerce in the great city centers,” but also to protect “the interest of
the public in the quality of life and the total community
165
environment . . . .” But it is hard to see why a concern for “the quality
of life and total community environment” would justify restricting
private web surfing, or borrowing or accepting a DVD from a friend.
Such private cultural activities have little more impact—by themselves—
on the total community environment than does a single person’s viewing
166
of a video on her own TV set and DVD player. Moreover, it is not
clear how the government’s interest in the “total community
environment” could ever warrant restricting the speech or thoughts of an
individual member of that community—unless it drew on precisely the
167
kind of aggregation principle that was used in Wickard v. Filburn, but
this is foreign to First Amendment jurisprudence. The First Amendment,
for example, does not classify speech itself as “inciting” because the
speech is one small component of a large set of acts that together
168
constitute incitement. Nor does it classify speech as “commercial”
because its effect is commercial only when considered in conjunction
169
with numerous other instances of speech. In short, such an attempt to
hold Stanley inapplicable to the public wire lines based on its alleged
effects confronts the same question that Justice Black first raised in his
dissent in United States v. Reidel: “The mere act of importation for
private use can hardly be more offensive to others than is private perusal
170
in one’s home.”
Another possibility lies in the sense that, however free people might
be to introduce obscenity into their own thoughts, they should not be
free to introduce it into the channels of communication that are shared
with, and sustained by, the public. But the First Amendment public
forum doctrine—which, among other things, prevents the government
171
from restricting speech on the basis of content in parks and streets —
obscene thought to their psychotherapists, sketch an allegedly obscene picture in a private diary while
riding on a bus, or e-mail an allegedly obscene story to a friend.
165. 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973).
166. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 159–61.
168. On the contrary, the particular speech act that the State wishes to restrict as incitement must
be “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and [be] likely to incite or produce such
action.” Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 155–57 (listing factors the Court uses to determine
whether an instance of speech constitutes commercial speech).
170. United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 381 & n.* (1971) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (providing a joint dissent for Riedel and Thirty-Seven Photographs).
171. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (“In places[,
including streets and parks,] which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to
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requires the government to protect speech that is not only unpopular, but
that expressly challenges constitutional principles. The government may
not, for example, deny neo-Nazis the right to march in a street or rally at
172
a park. Even certain low-value speech, such as outdoor advertisements
173
for cigarettes, is insulated against government restriction. The speech
that travels through internet cables and inside of sealed envelopes is, if
anything, likely to be much less of an emotional burden on those who
find it objectionable, since, unlike the speech in streets and parks, it will
likely remain entirely invisible and inaudible to them. In fact, the data
packets that travel through the Internet have little meaning to anyone in
between the point of transmission and reception unless that person goes
to the effort to intercept and to reassemble all of them into the image or
text they carry. It is true that some members of the public might be
offended simply by the knowledge that government-supported channels
of communication are carrying such material, even if it never reaches
174
their eyes and ears. But the same people may be equally offended by
their awareness of the other resources that allow the Stanleys of the
country to view obscenity: the police and security, neighborhood
maintenance, and building code requirements, for example, that help
Stanley watch and enjoy his preferred films in his own home. Or the
protections the State offers to the development and sale of the TV and
DVD technology that allow Stanley to watch obscenity in his home. It is
a mistake, in other words, to assume that the original film viewing in
Stanley happened without the same kind of state and societal framework
that is necessary to sustain and nourish technologies of communication
or of transport.
One other possible means of justifying the distinction that the Court
has drawn between private and public life in applying Stanley is to
redefine it: It is not, one might argue, first and foremost about the line
between the intimate life of the home and the social environment outside
of it, but rather the line between those activities that involve only a
solitary actor and those that involve contacts with others. What
175
distinguishes Reidel, or the protagonists of Whorley, from Stanley,
perhaps, is that they were not merely producing or in possession of

assembly and debate, the rights of the State to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.”).
172. See Village of Skokie v. Nat’l Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21, 24 (Ill. 1978) (“The
display of the swastika, as offensive to the principles of a free nation as the memories it recalls may be,
is symbolic political speech intended to convey to the public the beliefs of those who display it.”).
173. See Lorrilard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561–66 (striking down such limitations on
cigarette advertising as unconstitutionally limiting).
174. See Steven D. Smith, Is the Harm Principle Illiberal?, 51 Am. J. Juris. 1, 16 (2006) (“[Y]ou
(the viewer of XXX movies) cannot plausibly deny that some citizens do feel emotional distress
because of what you are doing: indeed, it may be obvious that they are deeply unhappy about your
movie-watching predilections.”).
175. See United States v. Whorley, 569 F.3d 211, 212 (4th Cir. 2009).
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obscenity for their own viewing, but rather were attempting to send it to
others. They were, in other words, disseminating it out into the world,
rather than keeping it to themselves—and it is this attempt to spread
obscene speech that makes it a public concern in the way that Stanley’s
original viewing was not.
One might analogize this to that which helps to define the contours
of another form of problematic speech: defamation. One becomes liable
for defamation not merely by viewing or listening to false speech, but by
making that speech to others under conditions in which one knows, or
176
should know, of its false or defamatory nature. One is not guilty of
177
defamation merely by listening to it. The same is true of incitement: It
is the inciter, not his target audience, who is subject to prosecution for
178
trying to foment violence. One might draw the same distinction here: A
person who merely views pornography in his home or on his computer
terminal is protected by Stanley’s right to receive information and ideas.
The person or entity who knowingly delivers it to him is not.
There is, however, an important weakness in this analogy. An
audience member who merely hears defamation or incitement is simply a
passive recipient of such information and may not believe in or act upon
it. By contrast, the person who orders obscene speech through the mail
or downloads it from the Internet is a more active participant and is
likely to be aware of its obscene nature when doing so. They are, in a
sense, not merely viewing it, but cooperating with the sender to provide
it to themselves. Moreover, they act as their own providers in this sense,
even when there is no identifiable sender. When Stanley goes to the shelf
where he stored an obscene film and then places it in a projector he has
179
purchased, he provides his own means of viewing the film. When he
goes to his personal storage space in the cloud and downloads an obscene
video he previously uploaded there, he is, again, serving as his own
provider. Why then should the State be allowed to punish a provider of
obscene speech only when it is a person other than the viewer or listener
himself? One might suggest that it is generally more permissible for the
government to prevent harm inflicted by one person upon another than
to prevent a person’s harm to herself. This argument is weak where a

176. Thus, the elements of defamation include “a false and defamatory statement concerning
another” and “an unprivileged publication [of that statement] to a third party.” Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 558 (1977).
177. Id. (listing no element that embraces receipt of the communication).
178. As noted above, speech is punishable only if the speech is “directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 447 (1969).
179. Indeed, some of the cases held Stanley inapplicable by implausibly extending the kind of
speech-delivery that is counted as “commercial” and permitted the State to punish individuals who
were carrying materials only for their own private viewing. See, e.g., United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of
Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973).
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person inflicts such “harm” according to another’s wishes, instead of
against them. If the government cannot paternalistically restrict whatever
harm flows from obscenity when a person imposes it on herself without
help, it is not clear why it should be able to impose such restriction when
help is available and only with respect to the helper, instead of the
180
person helped to obtain obscene speech.
In short, there are no characteristics of public space that mark it out
as wholly inappropriate for the freedom-of-thought protection identified
in Stanley. Going forward, one option for courts is to go back to the turn
in the road taken by the Court in Reidel and to rethink precisely how its
limitation of Stanley should be understood. In the first place, we might
note that the Court in Reidel did not evict Stanley’s protection from all
corners of public space or channels of information, but simply from those
181
that carried and enabled the “business in obscenity.” Where use of an
e-mail service or interactive computer service does not involve any such
business, it should not automatically be denied Stanley’s freedom-ofthought protection simply on the basis that it occurs in channels of
communication that are also, at times, channels of commerce.
Reidel also differentiated Stanley by noting that it dealt with
possession and individual perception of obscene materials, whereas
182
Reidel’s sending of such materials was “distribution.” This distinction,
however, only makes sense under circumstances where it is possible to
distinguish the acts that constitute possession and perception from those
that constitute distribution. Where the act of distribution merges into the
activity of possessing a text, image, or video—as it does in use of the
cloud to access stored materials or use of an eReader—Stanley should
183
not cease to protect the possession and perception that takes place.
This leaves us with an alternative vision of how Stanley should apply
in the twenty-first century, one quite different from the widely espoused
notion that it is without force in any circumstances other than its original,
increasingly archaic, setting. Stanley should apply not only to the brickand-mortar environment that used to define the boundaries of home life.
It should also apply to those of our interactions with the contemporary

180. Whorley, 569 F.3d at 214 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Stanley should protect the
sender of non-commercial e-mails with obscene text where there is no harm caused).
181. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 354–57 (1971).
182. Id. at 356.
183. Osborne v. Ohio and subsequent cases analyzing possession of child pornography limited
Stanley’s reach in a manner entirely unrelated to whether the material is viewed inside or outside the
home, whether it is commercial or non-commercial, or whether it is possessed or distributed. Even
purely private in-home possession of child pornography is made possible only by harming the child
who has been exploited (and whose dignity and mental well-being might suffer further damage from
distribution of the obscene materials). Osborne, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990) (“[T]he materials produced
by child pornographers permanently record the victim’s abuse. The pornography’s continued existence
causes the child victims continuing harm by haunting the children in years to come.”).

Blitz_62-HLJ-357.doc (Do Not Delete)

December 2010]

STANLEY IN CYBERSPACE

1/13/2011 10:38 AM

391

public environment that are functionally equivalent to our in-home lives
insofar as they involve (1) private access to and viewing of materials,
rather than wide distribution of them, and (2) like the home, have a
primarily non-commercial nature. As long as obscenity or other lowvalue speech has such features and also lacks the harm-threatening
characteristics of child pornography or other speech likely to cause
significant damage to third parties, it should be safeguarded against state
restriction.
Still, there are some who may hesitate to accept this narrower vision
of Stanley without considering another possible basis for limiting Stanley
to home life, traditionally understood. Thus, the next subpart turns from
asking what is special about public space (where Stanley’s freedom of
thought is allegedly unsuitable) to asking what is special about the
physical space of the home that might (as the Court has insisted) make it
the only environment where Stanley’s protection can have any force.
B. STANLEY and the Uniqueness of the Home
I have assumed thus far that even if one objects to extending
Stanley’s freedom-of-thought protection to cover our public activities,
one can at least imagine how such an extension might work. After all, it
is not merely in the home, but also in public space that we engage in
intellectual exploration and private reflection about the things we see
and hear. If Stanley is meant to protect our ability to perceive the world
free of blinders, and to deliberate about it free from external
interference, why wouldn’t its protections be able to follow those
activities out of the home and into public space?
But this question, one might object, fundamentally misunderstands
the holding of Stanley. The home, some might argue, was not merely one
site that a person might, as the Court put it, “satisfy his intellectual and
184
emotional needs” almost entirely insulated from government control; it
was an inseparable part of the freedom that Stanley was identifying. The
Court after all, did not simply give people a right to “satisfy his
intellectual or emotional needs,” but rather a “right to satisfy [them] in
185
the privacy of [their] own home[s].” If that is right, then the problem
with attempting to carry freedom of thought beyond the walls of the
home is not merely that it is inappropriate or harmful beyond those
walls, but that it cannot, by definition, extend beyond them, because it is
no longer the same liberty.
Why, then, might Stanley be inextricably linked to the home in this
way, when our mental activity and powers of perception are not so
confined? One possible answer has to do with the nature of the home.

184. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
185. Id. (emphasis added).
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There is, one might claim, something about the home, and the role it
plays in our lives, that makes it an irreplaceable sanctuary for this
particular kind of freedom. One might argue, for example, that the home
attained its status as a place to hide from the outside world, in large part
because of its nature as a place where our ownership gives us a greater
degree of control over the environment than anywhere else. As Friedrich
Hayek has argued, “[f]reedom . . . presupposes that the individual has
some assured private sphere, that there is some set of circumstances in
186
his environment with which others cannot interfere.” In Hayek’s view,
it is in large part individual property rights that define this sphere: Our
property rights in the space of the home help to carve out a piece of the
environment where our decisionmaking power is subject to minimal state
187
interference. The same vision of the home, as the deepest and most
insulated retreat from the external world, plays an important role in
Fourth Amendment law where, as Justice Scalia noted in Kyllo, “[i]n the
home . . . all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held
188
safe from prying government eyes.”
This view provides the basis for a possible response to my central
question as to why the scope of the First Amendment privacy protections
is so much narrower than is the scope of the Fourth Amendment privacy
protection recognized in Katz v. United States. Katz, one might argue,
provides the wrong Fourth Amendment analogy, because it protects
against warrantless monitoring information on phone lines that might
well be innocent—or even valuable—conversation, information of a sort
189
that the government has no business spying on. By contrast, the
obscene film at issue in Stanley has no such value: It is, by definition,
information that the government can bar or restrict, and—much like a
wanted criminal who has found sanctuary in a foreign embassy—is saved
from state regulation not because of what it is, but only because of where
it is. If that is so, then the correct Fourth Amendment analogy is
provided not by Katz, but by a combination of the Court’s decisions in
190
191
United States v. Place and Kyllo v. United States. In Place, the Court
made clear that when a government search technique—in that case, a
192
police dog trained to alert only to drugs —“discloses only the presence

186. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 13 (Phoenix ed. 1978).
187. Id. at 140 (emphasizing how a “protected sphere” for individual action is established in part
through “recognition of private property”).
188. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).
189. 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (“[T]he public telephone has come to play [a vital role] in private
communication.”); see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 56–60 (1967) (discussing that
eavesdropping in criminal investigations is necessarily “broad in scope,” because it indiscriminately
records all of a conversation and not simply those parts relevant to criminal activity).
190. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
191. 533 U.S. 27.
192. 462 U.S. at 697–98.
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or absence of . . . a contraband item” then there can be no threat to any
Fourth Amendment privacy interests, since no one has a legitimate
193
interest in hiding possession of a criminal substance. The same rule
should apply in the First Amendment context, one might argue, where
one’s contraband is informational contraband with no First Amendment
value. However, one might add, drawing on Kyllo, that even certain
forms of contraband that do not generate a constitutional shield by
themselves, do stand behind such a shield in the home because, as noted
above, “[i]n the home . . . all details are intimate details,” and “the entire
194
area is held safe from prying government eyes.”
The Court seemed to adopt a similar interpretation of Stanley in
United States v. Reidel. Stanley’s freedom of thought, it insisted, did not
depend at all on the nature of the material Stanley was watching; this
freedom did “not depend on whether the materials are obscene or
195
whether obscenity is constitutionally protected.” Rather, his right to
watch these (or any) materials in private was “independently saved by
196
the Constitution.” More specifically, the First Amendment rights at
issue in Stanley, arose from something about Stanley’s situation other
than the film he was viewing—and that something, assumed the Court,
197
had to be the intimate and private environment he was in.
There are, however, some puzzles in this interpretation of Stanley. It
cannot be, after all, that everything one does in the privacy of one’s home
is covered by the First Amendment. On the contrary, the Court in
Stanley took pains to stress that “[w]hat we have said in no way infringes
upon the power of the State or Federal Government to make possession
198
of other items, such as narcotics, firearms, or stolen goods, a crime.”
Later courts have made it clear that one’s right to view even obscene
materials free of state interference does not prevent law enforcement
from punishing viewing of materials, like child pornography, the
production and dissemination of which entail harm to the children
199
depicted. But if illegal activities like possession of drugs or other
dangerous substances are not shielded from punishment by the walls of
the home, why is the possession of an illegally obscene film or book
shielded?

193. Id. at 707–08.
194. 533 U.S. at 37.
195. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 356 (1971).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 355 (noting that Stanley protects people only against the government’s unwanted
intrusion into their homes).
198. 394 U.S. 557, 568 n.11 (1969).
199. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109 (1990) (“The State does not rely on a paternalistic
interest in regulating Osborne’s mind. Rather, Ohio has enacted [this law] in order to protect the
victims of child pornography; it hopes to destroy a market for the exploitative use of children.”).
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There must be something about the latter activity other than its
location in the home which accounts for why it receives First
Amendment protection denied to other acts. One possibility is that, as
the Court proclaimed in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, even “low value” speech
actually has some First Amendment value: “We have not said,” the
Court made clear, that low-value speech “is in all respects worthless and
200
undeserving of constitutional protection.” Another possibility is that
even if Stanley’s obscene film viewing is devoid of any protectable First
Amendment expression, it might involve the exercise of another distinct
First Amendment freedom, namely, the freedom of thought. Because
Stanley’s viewing of a film would—unlike selling drugs or manufacturing
chemicals—only involve perceiving and thinking, it may be that it falls
within the scope of freedom of thought, even if it is outside the scope of
201
freedom of speech per se. But these suggestions raise doubts about the
argument that the freedoms in Stanley are inextricably tied to the home:
Once we recognize that even speech ostensibly outside the scope of the
Free Speech Clause, such as obscenity, may well have some First
Amendment value—either because there is some residual First
Amendment value in all expression, or because it is an exercise of our
freedom of thought—then the question arises as to why this value cannot
be recognized to offer some protection outside of the home’s walls.
In fact, while it is in the nature of the home to offer a very effective
sanctuary for our private intellectual and cultural lives, it is not the only
such sanctuary, and is often not even the most effective or suitable one.
It is not the most effective, because the physical walls of the home often
leak sound, and the windows sometimes allow glimpses from on202
lookers. Moreover, for those who share a home with family members
or roommates, one’s private reading or film-viewing choices may well be
subject to observation by others within the home environment. By
contrast, a password-protected space in the cloud on the Web might be
far more closed off to the world, at least so long as the electronic walls
that safeguard it prevent outside breaches. Moreover, the home is often
not a suitable place for inner exploration, because one must sometimes
venture far outside the home (either physically or through cyberspace) to
obtain resources that are sometimes crucial for reflecting upon, and
addressing, intellectual and emotional needs: books or other cultural
200. 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992) (quoting id. at 401 (White, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
201. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Freedom of 3D Thought: The First Amendment in Virtual
Reality, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1141, 1192–93 (2008).
202. Indeed, the Court has made it clear that warrantless visual surveillance of the home’s
windows from a public street does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 31–32 (2001) (noting that historically, visual surveillance from outside the home was
considered clearly lawful because “the eye cannot . . . be guilty of a trespass” (quoting Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 628 (1886) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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sources from outside, discussions with therapists or religious counselors,
and other sources of guidance. Indeed, in some cases, an individual may
find that free thought and intellectual exploration require not a retreat
into the home, but an escape from it. Consider the case of a young man
or woman like the protagonist of The Chosen who needed to make secret
trips to the public library to explore a secular world that was forbidden
203
territory in his family’s strict religious environment. Or the young man
profiled in a New York Times story who furtively uses the Internet to
find and read materials that help him live with, and reflect upon, his
204
homosexuality. For such individuals, home life interferes with, rather
than supports, their freedom of thought.
If it is not the nature of the home considered by itself that justifies
the First Amendment shield raised by Stanley, it may be that there is also
something else about the home that does so—namely, its special status in
social convention and history. Even if the role the home plays in our lives
is not unique, and even if we can find places outside the home in which
we feel more comfortable and safe from others’ observation, these other
places—for better or worse—do not have the same historically and
legally significant pedigree that the private residence has acquired over
the centuries.
In this respect, one might argue, the freedom-of-thought protection
that Stanley recognizes in the home is quite similar to the protections
provided by the public forum doctrine to “traditional public forums.”
This doctrine sets aside for unfettered debate and dialogue, certain
205
government-owned property, most notably, streets and parks. While
the government may impose content-based speech restrictions on much
of the public property it operates—for example, it may bar protests in
206
military bases or disallow disruptive speech in public schools —it
generally may not impose such restrictions in streets and parks. The
reason is not simply because of the nature of streets and parks, but
because of the tradition that surrounds them. As the Court said in the
case that launched the development of the public forum doctrine, the
1939 case of Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, “use of the
streets and public places [for unfettered discussion] has, from ancient
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of

203. Chaim Potok, The Chosen 86–87 (1967) (describing a young man who secretly visits the
public library to escape from an Orthodox Jewish household so that he can read secular literature).
204. Jennifer Egan, Lonely Gay Teen Seeking Same: How Jeffrey Found Friendship, Sex,
Heartache—and Himself—Online, N.Y. Times (Magazine), Dec. 10, 2000, at 110.
205. See supra text accompanying note 171.
206. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (holding that regulations barring political rallies
or demonstrations in a military base were constitutional under the First Amendment); DeFabio v. E.
Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist., 623 F.3d 71, 77–78 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Student speech . . . may be
restricted if the speech will ‘materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the
school.’” (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969))).

Blitz_62-HLJ-357.doc (Do Not Delete)

396

1/13/2011 10:38 AM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
207

[Vol. 62:357

208

citizens.” As I have noted elsewhere, this claim was a misleading one:
in the late nineteenth- to early twentieth-century, managers of public
parks in America often barred political, religious, and commercial speech
from parks on the ground that parks were supposed to be places for
209
peaceful relaxation. Thus, the Court in Hague was not simply giving
legal recognition to a pre-existing social convention, but rather creatively
and selectively using the social convention surrounding parks to satisfy a
perceived constitutional need, namely, the First Amendment need for
some space where individuals might meet, debate, or protest, and where
they could not simply be silenced by a government edict denying them a
place to speak or listen. The Court in Stanley, one might argue, did
precisely the same thing for the home: It drew upon strong social norms
of home privacy to answer a constitutional need it perceived for some
space in which individuals could read books, watch videos, or engage in
other cultural activities free from worries that doing so could easily
trigger state interference.
Moreover, one might argue, the public forum doctrine also provides
a model for refusing to extend Stanley’s protection beyond its original
boundary lines. Many commentators have noted that people now
typically seek debate and reading materials not in parks but on the Web
210
or through other electronic media. Along with at least one Supreme
Court Justice (Justice Kennedy), commentators have called for updating
the public forum doctrine to include these new forums for debate and
211
212
deliberation. But the majority of the Court has disagreed, perhaps
because while the public forum doctrine has First Amendment benefits,
the rules of the traditional public forum weaken the government’s lawmaking ability; to allow these rules to spill beyond traditional categories
might thus weaken government power in many areas where it needs to
be robust. The same might be argued about Stanley: It makes sense to
limit it to the traditional confines of the home, even as certain features of
home life migrate into electronic realms, because a constitutional limit on

207. 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
208. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Constitutional Safeguards for Silent Experiments in Living: Libraries,
the Right to Read, and a First Amendment Theory for an Unaccompanied Right to Receive Information,
74 UMKC L. Rev. 799, 834–36 (2006).
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., Noah D. Zatz, Note, Sidewalks in Cyberspace: Making Space for Public Forums in
the Electronic Environment, 12 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 149, 200–01 (1998).
211. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 802–03 (1996)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (“Minds
are not changed in streets and parks as they once were. To an increasing degree, the more significant
interchanges of ideas and shaping of public consciousness occur in mass and electronic media.”).
212. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 698 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (advocating for the creation of public forums in cyberspace, administered by the State, to
provide the electronic equivalent of the sidewalks in the physical world).

Blitz_62-HLJ-357.doc (Do Not Delete)

December 2010]

STANLEY IN CYBERSPACE

1/13/2011 10:38 AM

397

government power as disabling as Stanley’s should not be lightly
extended.
There are, however, two problems with this argument for limiting
Stanley to the home and denying its protections to our private
interactions in cyberspace. First, the same strategy has not entirely
succeeded in the public forum doctrine. The Court has officially refused
to extend the protection of the traditional public forum doctrine beyond
213
streets and parks. However, it has provided an extension of sorts,
quietly and unofficially, by creating a new rule that provides traditional
public forum-type protections to other government-owned properties. In
the 2001 case of Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, it announced a rule
that even with respect to properties where the government has more
leeway to regulate speech, it may not use this leeway to “use an existing
medium of expression and to control it . . . in ways which distort its usual
214
functioning.” Consequently, even where government property does
not, like parks or streets, have a long historical tradition of setting it
aside for unfettered speech, it may still have certain social practices
associated with it that present a barrier to certain kinds of speech
regulations. Because such limits on speech regulation arise from the
inherent nature of public property itself, rather than from government
designation, the government cannot remove them simply by declaring
such property a non-public forum. For example, in Velazquez, the Court
held that barring lawyers from making certain kinds of arguments would
distort the expression that lawyers must engage in to serve as effective
215
advocates. One might argue that the Court should consider similar
measures in understanding the reach of Stanley. Even if no environment
can provide the same protection for freedom of thought that the home
has been held to provide, other environments might play an important,
albeit more specific or limited, role in protecting or advancing our
freedom to think, and would be disabled from doing so by certain kinds
of government limits. Such institutions may include libraries, counseling
centers, or other places in public life that people often go to engage in
private reflection that may not be possible in their homes.
This difficulty with holding fast to the present, very narrow limits of
Stanley is closely connected with a second problem. However appealingly
simple it might be to limit Stanley’s reach to a single, easily identifiable
environment, such simplicity is unjustified if it fails to protect the
freedom Stanley was meant to assure. Freedom of thought might
intuitively be threatened not only by intrusions into home life, but also
by other government invasions into individuals’ attempts to shape their
213. Id. at 679 (refusing to find that airports are public fora similar to streets and parks).
214. 531 U.S. 533, 542–43 (2001).
215. Id. at 544 (“[The State] may not design a subsidy to effect [a] serious and fundamental
restriction on advocacy of attorneys and the functioning of the judiciary.”).
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own psyche—for example, by government limits on or monitoring of the
books individuals read outside of the homes, of the counseling sessions
they seek with therapists or other sources of guidance, or of cultural
exploration they engage in at libraries, theaters, or on websites. Again, a
Fourth Amendment example—this time, from the realm of Fourth
Amendment scholarship—is helpful here. As Anthony Amsterdam said,
in criticizing Fourth Amendment cases that permitted the government to
engage in aerial surveillance (with high magnification cameras) of certain
in-home environments, the Fourth Amendment has not provided enough
protection from police surveillance when it provides such protection only
to those who “retir[e] to the cellar, cloa[k] all the windows with thick
216
caulking, tur[n] off the lights and remai[n] absolutely quiet.” A similar
observation might be made about the limits courts have placed on the
scope of Stanley. Indeed, such an observation has been made by Justice
217
Hugo Black. Stanley, he argued, will be of little value if it protects a
person only when he “writes salacious books in his attic, prints them in
218
his basement, and reads them in his living room.”
To update Black’s complaint with modern examples, how
meaningful is an individual’s First Amendment right to read the book of
their choice in her own home if she is not protected from governmentmandated remote deletion of an illegally obscene eBook? How protected
is she in the right to privately possess her own video in an age where the
only place she can feasibly store such a video is in a digital medium that
is inevitably linked to the data channels of the outside world—and where
information is increasingly stored in, and not simply sent through, servers
outside of the home? As Judge Gregory recently noted in dissenting
from a refusal to provide a rehearing en banc for a defendant convicted,
in part, for an e-mail describing a sexual fantasy: “In today’s world, our
e-mail inbox, just as much as our home, has become the place where we
store the ‘memorabilia of [our] thoughts and dreams,’ and the same
principles that animated Stanley call now for Stanley’s extension to” such
219
technology.

216. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 402
(1974).
217. United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 382 (1971) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
218. Id.
219. United States v. Whorley, 569 F.3d 211, 214 (4th Cir. 2009) (Gregory, J., dissenting), denying
reh’g en banc to 550 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 2008).
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Conclusion
His stove had reverted. Back to an ancient Buck naturalgas model with clogged burners and encrusted oven
door . . . . The TV set had receded back a long way; he
found himself confronted by a dark, wood-cabinet,
Atwater-Kent tuned radio-frequency oldtime AM
radio . . . . The vidphone had been replaced by a black,
hook-style, upright telephone. Pre dial.
220
—Philip K. Dick, Ubik
I look around and see only what’s obsolete
The early versions of things in redesign
221
—The Loud Family, Backward Century

For almost all of the forty years since it has been decided, Stanley v.
Georgia has been widely cited for its ringing endorsement of freedom of
thought. It has also been largely isolated from the rest of First
Amendment law and frozen in time, covering only the late-Sixties
technology of its era. For example, it strongly protects the right to read
the book of one’s choice in the privacy of one’s living room, but may not
protect the right to read an eBook beamed wirelessly from the outside
world to a digital reading device. It protects the right to view a film on an
old-fashioned projector, but probably would not protect the right to store
and view a video the way viewers increasingly watch them, by accessing a
video file stored in a far-away server and running it on one’s own
computer or mobile device. And it protects the physical spaces that
shield intimate activities and communication, but not their functional
equivalents in virtual worlds or cyberspace storage lockers.
I have argued that there is little sense in continuing to view Stanley
as an isolated, unchanging island, separated from the public world. As
with Fourth Amendment search and seizure law, as transformed by Katz
v. United States, courts should abandon the fiction that our private
internal and expressive lives remain hidden inside of our privately owned
houses and buildings. The Court in Katz recognized that the “persons,
houses, papers, and effects” must be understood to encompass the
electronic environments and channels that evolved to serve many of the
same functions. As noted above, the First Amendment public forum
doctrine has too: Although the Court has refused to expand the
definition of “traditional public forum” beyond streets and parks, it has

220. Dick, supra note 1, at 724, 726.
221. The Loud Family, Backward Century, on Attractive Nuisance (Alias Records 2000).
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nonetheless extended First Amendment protection to new environments
like the Internet by recognizing their special place in First Amendment
222
law, and by warning the government that the Constitution bars it from
223
distorting “the usual functioning of a medium of communication.” The
freedom of thought safeguarded in Stanley likewise deserves to be saved
from becoming an anachronism. Like freedom from unreasonable
searches and freedom to speak in public, the freedom to think and
receive information privately deserves to be staunchly protected from
state censors—and to be protected in the spaces where we exercise this
freedom now, not only those where we exercised it forty years ago.
As I have shown, moreover, courts do not need to revolutionize
First Amendment law to update and salvage Stanley. They must merely
recognize that in the online world of the twenty-first century, it is no
longer plausible to offer First Amendment protection to an individual’s
personal library only on the condition that she keep that library separate
from, and unconnected to, the Internet. Even the most private reading
and film viewing is no longer easy to isolate from the network of
computers outside the home. Courts must recognize that possessing and
viewing a film increasingly entails having it transmitted into one’s home
over electronic channels. The act of distribution, in other words, can no
longer be disentangled from that of reading, viewing, or simply
possessing cultural materials. State punishment of the former thus,
necessarily imposes censorship of the latter—and imposes precisely the
kind of harm Stanley was meant to prevent.

222. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997) (describing the Web as “a vast library,”
providing immediate access to millions of titles, and noting the Internet’s crucial role in modern
communication).
223. See supra text accompanying notes 213–14.

